The easy antibiotics were found first
The golden age of discovery was real, and it ended for scientific reasons before economic ones made the problem worse.
The method Selman Waksman pioneered in the late 1930s was simple: grow soil microbes, see which ones killed bacteria, purify the active compound. It produced streptomycin, tetracyclines, erythromycin and many more, and almost two-thirds of all antibiotic classes came from that era. But each new screen found mostly the same molecules again, a problem chemists call rediscovery. By the 1980s the method was exhausted.
The second barrier is biological. Gram-negative bacteria wrap themselves in two membranes and actively pump foreign molecules back out. A compound that kills bacteria in a dish often cannot reach a high enough concentration inside these cells. That is why the WHO’s list of critical threats is dominated by Gram-negatives, and why activity against resistant Gram-negatives is a separate, essential measure of pipeline quality.
New ways of looking are working again
Genome sequencing lets researchers see the antibiotic-making genes in microbes that cannot be grown in the lab. Machine learning can screen millions of virtual molecules for ones that kill bacteria, and generative models can design compounds unlike any existing antibiotic. None of these early candidates is yet a medicine, but the scientific drought is ending.
Six steps, and the last one breaks the chain
Every new antibiotic has to clear the same hurdles as any drug, plus one unique to antibiotics: it is meant to be used sparingly.
Finding a molecule
Screening soil microbes, chemical libraries or AI-generated designs for something that kills bacteria without harming human cells.
- Measure
- Novel hits per screen · rediscovery rate
- Failure boundary
- Most natural-product screens rediscover antibiotics already known, wasting years.
Where the frontier moves
Mining genomes of microbes that cannot be grown in the lab, and generative AI that proposes structurally new compounds.
Getting inside the bacterium
Gram-negative bacteria have a double membrane and pumps that expel drugs. A molecule must cross both and stay inside.
- Measure
- Accumulation inside the cell · efflux
- Failure boundary
- Compounds that kill in a dish often fail to penetrate the bacteria that matter most.
Where the frontier moves
Chemical rules for Gram-negative entry, and drugs that attack the outer membrane itself, like zosurabalpin.
Safety and dosing
Achieving a killing concentration at the site of infection without damaging kidneys, liver or nerves.
- Measure
- Therapeutic window · toxicity findings
- Failure boundary
- Several older last-resort antibiotics are toxic; a narrow window ends many candidates.
Where the frontier moves
Better early toxicity prediction and targeted delivery.
Clinical trials
Showing the drug works in patients, usually by proving it is no worse than an existing antibiotic.
- Measure
- Cost and time per approval · enrolment rate
- Failure boundary
- Patients with resistant infections are scattered and sick, so trials are slow and expensive.
Where the frontier moves
Shared trial networks and regulatory pathways for drugs that treat small groups with few options.
Stewardship
Once approved, a new antibiotic is held in reserve and used only when older drugs fail, to slow the spread of resistance.
- Measure
- Prescriptions per year · resistance rate
- Failure boundary
- The more responsibly a drug is used, the less it sells.
Where the frontier moves
Diagnostics that identify the right patients quickly, so the right drug is used early.
Getting paid
Sales must cover manufacturing, safety monitoring and the decade of development behind the drug.
- Measure
- Annual revenue vs post-approval cost
- Failure boundary
- Average sales of around $46 million a year cannot repay a $1.3 billion development cost.
Where the frontier moves
Subscription payments that reward having a drug available, not how much of it is sold.
A drug we should save cannot pay for itself
Most medicines earn more when they are used more. A new antibiotic does the most good when it is used as little as possible.
The arithmetic is stark. About $1.3 billion to reach approval, counting the candidates that fail along the way, followed by roughly $350 million over ten years to manufacture, monitor and support the drug once it is on the market. Against that, new antibiotics have averaged $46 million a year in sales. Achaogen won approval for plazomicin in June 2018, earned about $800,000 from it by the end of that year, and filed for bankruptcy in April 2019. One analysis estimated that a drug for hospital-acquired pneumonia could be worth over $12 billion to society and negative $4 million to the company that made it.
The value of a reserve medicine is the option to use it
An antibiotic can be enormously useful while treating relatively few patients. Its availability makes a dangerous operation, transplant or course of chemotherapy safer because clinicians have a rescue option if a resistant infection develops. Much of that value accrues to hospitals and patients who never need the drug. A per-prescription payment collects only a small part of it. Stewardship is therefore one reason the market fails, alongside short treatment courses, cheap older alternatives and the small patient populations for some resistant infections. PASTEUR sponsors’ June 2026 statement
Discovery remains difficult even if payment is repaired. Gram-negative bacteria have an outer membrane that excludes many molecules, pumps that remove others, and enzymes that disable drugs that get through. Zosurabalpin attacks the machinery that moves lipopolysaccharide into that membrane, a different route from simply finding another conventional antibiotic. Its narrow focus on Acinetobacter also makes rapid organism identification more important. A targeted drug, an effective diagnostic and reliable access need to arrive together. Zosurabalpin discovery paper, Nature, 2024
The reserve-value explanation is economic interpretation. A new mechanism does not guarantee clinical benefit or prevent bacteria from evolving resistance.
Why would anyone invest in a new antibiotic?
A new antibiotic takes about a decade and over a billion dollars to reach patients, and is then used as little as possible to slow resistance. Add a payment that does not depend on volume and see what it takes to make the investment rational.
Negative return under these assumptions
- Development, discounted
- −$879m
- Sales after costs, discounted
- +$29m
- Subscription payments, discounted
- +$0m
- Annual revenue floor needed to break even
- $372m/yr
The $1.3 billion preset is a hypothetical undiscounted cash budget, using the scale of published development estimates; it is not an empirical reconstruction, because reported R&D totals can already include financing. Sales of $46 million and upkeep of $35 million per year are approximate scenario inputs. The $300 million floor uses the top band in the June 2026 PASTEUR proposal. Payments are offset by gross sales here as a proxy for the proposal’s net-revenue offset. England’s subscription has different contract terms and is not replicated.
Calculation & assumptions
Assumed cash outlay is spread in equal installments at years 0–9, and discounted to year 0. Sales and upkeep begin at year 10. Annual payment = max(0, contract floor − sales); annual receipts = max(sales, floor), avoiding double counting. Break-even floor = discounted development ÷ discounted post-approval annuity factor + annual upkeep. Cash, capitalized cost and present value are distinct accounting measures. Excluded: taxes, separate technical-success probabilities, partnerships and net-versus-gross revenue adjustments. Contract periods above ten years are sensitivity cases, not PASTEUR terms.
Paying for readiness
The fix most economists favour is called a pull incentive: a payment that rewards a useful antibiotic for existing, decoupled from how much is sold. England pioneered it with a subscription model and in 2024 expanded it to £100 million a year, with contracts worth up to £20 million a year for the most important new drugs. In the United States, the PASTEUR Act, reintroduced in Congress for the fourth time in 2026, proposes contracts of $75–300 million a year, with payments reduced by net product revenue. The model above shows why size matters: at a typical development cost, the top payment band can still fail to cover the illustrative discounted investment, especially because the 2026 proposal offsets payments by product revenue. Large pull payments combined with cheaper, faster discovery are what make the investment clearly worthwhile.
Fix the payment, then the science pays off
The scientific tools are improving quickly. They will only produce medicines if someone is willing to fund the decade between a discovery and a prescription.
Count useful innovation, and pay for dependable access
WHO’s 2025 pipeline is a snapshot with a 15 February cutoff: 90 clinical products, including 50 conventional antibiotics and 40 non-traditional approaches. Its short release reports 15 innovative candidates and a five-candidate critical-threat headline. The detailed dashboard lists 21 of 27 priority-pathogen antibiotics with expected activity against at least one critical pathogen. The summary does not clearly reconcile these counts, so the chart uses the explicitly defined dashboard category; five must not be read as the total number with any critical-pathogen activity. Gepotidacin reached FDA approval in March 2025. Zosurabalpin remains an investigational programme, with Roche reporting phase III development, rather than an available treatment. WHO’s detailed pipeline dashboard; FDA’s gepotidacin trial snapshot; Roche’s 2025 annual report
England’s subscription guidance pays according to assessed clinical value, with a top band of £20 million per year. Delinking revenue from volume can reward supply, surveillance and readiness without encouraging unnecessary prescribing. The United States’ June 2026 PASTEUR reintroduction proposes annual contracts with product-revenue offsets; it is not revenue already flowing to developers. The calculator’s $300 million case is a policy-scale scenario: its near-break-even result depends on when development spending occurs, the discount rate, upkeep and the payment period. It cannot establish the correct contract price for a particular drug. NHS subscription commercial guidance
Contracts also need enforceable supply and access terms. A capitalized development-cost estimate cannot be treated as an undiscounted cash budget without changing its meaning.
Pay for availability, not volume
Treat new antibiotics like fire insurance: a fixed annual payment for having an effective drug ready, independent of how many doses are used.
Make the payment big enough
Small subscriptions help at the margin. Economists estimate that a new class needs reward on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars a year to attract investment.
Fund discovery as a public good
The earliest research has the lowest commercial return and the highest public value. Public and philanthropic funds such as CARB-X fill that gap.
Search where nobody has looked
Most soil bacteria cannot be grown in the lab, and AI can explore chemical space no screen has covered.
Diagnose before prescribing
Fast tests that identify the bacterium and its resistance let doctors use narrow, new drugs precisely, which supports both stewardship and sales.
Share the burden internationally
Resistance crosses borders. A few countries paying subscriptions while others free-ride leaves the incentive too small.
Who is building what
Drug developers, discovery labs and the funds and governments trying to repair the market. Search the record, or filter by role.
GSKGepotidacin (Blujepa)A first-in-class triazaacenaphthylene that blocks two bacterial DNA enzymes
- Reported evidence
- FDA approved in March 2025 for uncomplicated urinary tract infections, the first new oral class for that use in nearly 30 years.
- Announced next step
- Further indications, including gonorrhoea.
- Unresolved risk
- Resistance development in wide outpatient use; commercial returns at stewardship-limited volumes.
RocheZosurabalpinA macrocyclic peptide that blocks transport of lipopolysaccharide to the outer membrane of Acinetobacter
- Reported evidence
- Moved into phase 3 for carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii less than 18 months after first human dosing.
- Announced next step
- Approval as the first new class against a Gram-negative pathogen in about 50 years.
- Unresolved risk
- Phase 3 efficacy and safety in very sick patients; a narrow spectrum limits sales.
MIT Collins lab / Phare BioAI-discovered antibioticsDeep learning and generative AI to find and design new antibacterial molecules
- Reported evidence
- Discovered halicin (2020) and abaucin (2023); in 2025 designed and screened over 36 million compounds, finding candidates against resistant gonorrhoea and MRSA.
- Announced next step
- Advancing AI-discovered candidates towards clinical trials through a non-profit developer.
- Unresolved risk
- Computational hits must survive toxicity, pharmacology and the cost of trials.
McMaster University / University of Illinois ChicagoLariocidinA lasso-peptide antibiotic from a soil bacterium that binds the ribosome in a new way
- Reported evidence
- Reported in Nature in 2025; active against several pathogens and in a mouse model of Acinetobacter infection.
- Announced next step
- Optimisation into a clinical candidate.
- Unresolved risk
- Peptides can be hard to manufacture and dose; years of development remain.
CARB-XEarly-stage acceleratorNon-dilutive funding for antibacterial research from discovery to early clinical trials
- Reported evidence
- Funded by governments and foundations to support projects private investors avoid.
- Announced next step
- Moving more novel candidates into human trials.
- Unresolved risk
- Push funding alone does not fix the lack of returns after approval.
AMR Action FundIndustry-backed investment fundAbout $1 billion from pharmaceutical companies and others invested in late-stage antibiotic developers
- Reported evidence
- Invests in clinical-stage companies to keep promising candidates alive.
- Announced next step
- Bringing two to four new antibiotics to patients by 2030.
- Unresolved risk
- Approved drugs still face weak markets without pull incentives.
NHS England / NICEAntimicrobial subscription modelFixed annual payments for access to new antimicrobials, independent of volume
- Reported evidence
- Expanded in 2024 to a £100 million annual budget, with contracts of up to £20 million a year for the most important drugs.
- Announced next step
- More drugs under contract and other countries adopting similar schemes.
- Unresolved risk
- One country’s payments are too small to change global investment decisions alone.
U.S. CongressPASTEUR ActFederal subscription contracts for critically needed antimicrobials
- Reported evidence
- Reintroduced for the fourth time in 2026, with proposed payments of $75–300 million a year per drug.
- Announced next step
- Passage and first contracts.
- Unresolved risk
- Has not passed in previous Congresses; payment size and eligibility rules remain contested.
A compound that clears infection in mice is a discovery, not a medicine. Most candidates fail in human trials, and roughly one in five infectious-disease drugs entering phase 1 is eventually approved.
An optimistic view, with conditions
The first new classes in decades are arriving
For the first time since the 1980s, new antibiotic classes are reaching patients or late-stage trials, and AI and genomics are refilling the discovery pipeline. If governments pay for antibiotics as essential infrastructure, those discoveries can become medicines.
Pay for readiness
Expand subscription models across more countries so a new antibiotic’s value no longer depends on overuse.
New classes through phase 3
Zosurabalpin and other new mechanisms must succeed in large trials against the resistant bacteria that kill most.
Discovery at machine speed
AI design and genome mining produce a steady supply of new classes, so resistance meets new drugs faster than it spreads.
Four numbers to watch
First, the number of new antibiotic classes in phase 3 or approved, especially against Gram-negative bacteria. Second, the total value of pull incentives committed worldwide per year. Third, the size of the WHO clinical pipeline and its share of innovative agents, updated every two years. Fourth, deaths attributable to resistance, the outcome that matters.
Sources, method, and boundaries
Pipeline counts are the WHO’s 2025 analysis. Death estimates are from the GRAM study in the Lancet. Revenue and cost figures come from published market analyses and are averages across a small number of drugs. The interactive model is an editorial net-present-value calculation, not a valuation of any company or product.
- Antibiotic class
- A group of antibiotics sharing a core chemical structure and way of killing bacteria.
- Gram-negative
- Bacteria with an extra outer membrane that makes them harder for drugs to enter.
- Pull incentive
- A reward paid after a drug is approved, such as a subscription, rather than funding for research before approval.
Read More
Essays, books, talks, and research that shaped this field’s arguments. Influence is not endorsement; company communications and advocacy are labeled. Some publisher links require a subscription.
- Report
WHO — Antibacterial agents in clinical and preclinical development (2025)
The biennial count of the global antibiotic pipeline and how innovative it is.
- Essay
Our World in Data — The golden age of antibiotics
A data-led history of when antibiotic classes were discovered.
- Essay
Pew — Addressing the economic hurdles facing antibiotic innovation
Why antibiotics fail commercially, and the policy options to fix it.
- Analysis
Kevin Outterson et al. — All-in cost of a new antibiotic from discovery to ten years on market
A worked estimate of the full cost of bringing an antibiotic to patients and keeping it there.
Across the fields: learning curves, deployment, and rebound
- Theodore Wright — Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes (1936)
The original experience-curve formulation: costs change with accumulated production.
- Kenneth Arrow — The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing (1962)
The economics of productivity improvement through production experience.
- William Stanley Jevons — The Coal Question (1865)
The classic rebound argument: lower effective costs can expand total demand.
- Arnulf Grübler — The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing (2010)
A counterexample to assuming that greater deployment always lowers costs.



















